2: Hudson E-4, 5 (1936) 1938 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

To give perspective in time and space to the Kazak material I have indicated the possible course of development of comparable social institutions among the Mongol tribes. In so doing I have relied chiefly on the work of Vladimirtsov.[7]

From the Kazak and Mongol material, supplemented by information from other groups, it has seemed permissable in conclusion to postulate certain general tendencies which appear to have been active in the formation of Turco-Mongol social structure. It must be emphasized, however, that the interpretations which I have ventured to make are to be considered only as a working hypothesis based on inadequate and incomplete material whose value must be tested by future investigations. More new problems have arisen than there have been solutions found to old ones.

Among those in America to whom special acknowledgements are due are my teachers, Dr. Edward Sapir and Dr. Leslie Spier, for aid and encouragement over many years. I am grateful to Professor George Vernadsky for numerous helpful suggestions. My obligations to friends in the Soviet Union are many. I am particularly indebted to the administrations of the Institute of Anthropology, Ethnography and Archaeology of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in Leningrad, and of the Kazakstan Base of the Academy of Sciences in Alma-ata. It would be presumptuous to thank Elizabeth E. Bacon who has shared the field work, research and writing.

Field work was considerably hampered by police regulation of the movement of foreigners in Kazakstan which restricted me to the town of Alma-ata and its immediate vicinity. Most of the information came from two informants: Umurzaq Kargabaiev and Nurqumandur Tlenshiev.[8] The former was a man 75 years of age living on the Kalinin Kolkhoz, a collective cattle farm about twenty kilometers from Alma-ata, which occupied part of the land formerly used by Kargabaiev's tribe of the Great Orda. He was well known in the Alma-ata district as a poet and musician and for his knowledge of Kazak traditions, genealogies and epics. He spoke only Kazak. Tlenshiev, 23 years old, came from a branch of the Little Orda in the southern Urals and was a student at the Pedagogical Institute in Alma-ata. His knowledge of Kazak culture was extensive but as regards the former social organization, mostly second-hand. He naturally evaluated old Kazak life in terms of the Marxist philosophy in which he had been educated so that his information must be weighed accordingly. He spoke Russian and acted as interpreter for me with Kargabaiev.[9] There were numerous other occasional informants, members of the Kalinin Kolkhoz and students of the Pedagogical Institute who took part in discussions as they happened to be present. In a somewhat different category was Professor S. J. Asfendiarov, president of the Kazakstan Base of the USSR Academy of Sciences and author of a history of Kazakstan. Although a

[7] Vladimirtsov, *Obshchestvennyĭ Stroĭ*.

[8] The second names are really patronymics used as family names with the Russian termination. Thus Tlenshiev's father was named Tlenshi.

[9] The fact that discussions had to be carried on in a language in which neither the interpreter nor the ethnographer was particularly proficient is regrettably but unavoidably reflected in the quality and quantity of some of the information.

2: Hudson E-4, 5 (1936) 1938 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Kazak by birth he was educated in Tashkent and St. Petersburg and his feeling for Kazak culture is more academic than personal. To him, however, I am indebted for many valuable suggestions.

From my informants I have derived the general concept of Kazak social groups, as discussed on pages 17 to 22, which I have not found explicitly stated elsewhere. Of published accounts the most useful has been that of Grodekov[10] which, though primarily a study of Kazak common law, contains much valuable material on tribal organization. An analysis of Grodekov's work in French by Dingelstedt[11] has been rather artifically systematized from the point of view of European jurisprudence but I have cited it where it seems to conform to the original.

The classic accounts of Levshin[12] and Radlov[13] have been the basis of all subsequent work among the Kazak. Particularly useful information has been furnished by the work of Kharuzin,[14] Somoflovich[15] and Rudenko.[16] Other sources are included in the bibliography.[17]

It has been impossible for me as yet to cover all the material relating to Kazak culture. Only a fraction of the published accounts is available in America and even in Soviet libraries it is frequently difficult to find many articles. For suggestions of the most pertinent sources I am indebted to Academician A. N. Samoflovich of the Orientological Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The most complete bibliography of publications relating to the Kazak is that compiled by Voznesenskaia and Piotrovskiĭ.[18] A list of bibliographies of historical and ethnographical material dealing with Central Asia in general has been collected by Pul'ner and Dobrin.[19]

In discussing Mongol social structure I have largely relied on the analysis by Vladimirtsov of material from Chinese, Mongol and Persian sources. For the early period of Mongol history, through the thirteenth century, the most important of these are the chronicles of Rashid-ad-Din and the so-called "Secret History" of the Mongols. The latter is an account of traditional history composed in Mongolia in 1240 and existing in both a Mongol and a Chinese version.[20] A Russian translation, to which I have referred, has been made from the Chinese text by Palladius.[21] A partial German translation has recently been published by Haenisch.[22]

[10] Grodekov, *Kirgizy i Karakirgizy*.
[11] Dingelstedt, *Le Droit coutumier*.
[12] Levshin, *Description des hordes*.
[13] Radlov, *Aus Sibirien*.
[14] Kharuzin, *Kirghizy Bukeevskoĭ Ordy*.
[15] Samoflovich, *Zapretnye Slova*, 161–68.
[16] Rudenko, *Ocherk Byta . . . Kazakov*, 1–72.
[17] See bibliography.
[18] Voznesenskaia and Piotrovskiĭ, *Materialy dlia Bibliografii*.
[19] Pul'ner and Dobrin, *Materialy dlia Bibliografii*, 146–60.
[20] Bartold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, 43.
[21] *Sokrovennoe Skazanie*.
[22] Haenisch, *Die letzten Feldzüge Cinggis Han's*, see Pelliot, *Review*, 157–67.

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1 [See cat. 116 -- Analyst]

2: Hudson E-4, 5 (1936) 1938 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

127 114 Rashid-ad-Din was the vizier of Ghazan Khan of the Mongol dynasty in Persia. His work, written between 1298 and 1307 at the commission of his sovereign, contains in addition to an extensive history very valuable accounts of the Mongol and Turkish tribes living in Central Asia in the days of Chingis. I have used the Russian translation by Berezin[23] because the French translation of Blochet[24] unfortunately does not include the section describing the nomad tribes.

Extensive commentaries on these and other oriental sources have been made by Bartold[25] and Bretschneider.[26]

I have also used the accounts of the early European travellers through Central Asia: Marco Polo,[27] Carpini and Rubruck.[28]

104 Kazak words were recorded in the orthography adopted in 1929. This orthography is based on the Latin alphabet with the addition of a few symbols for sounds not readily expressed by Latin characters. Approximate equivalents in English are as follows:

a	as in *father*
b	similar to English b
c	as English *sh*
ç	as *z* in *azure* (similar to French *j*)
d	similar to English *d*
e	as in *let*
ə	as the *a* in *at*
g	as in *get*
ƣ	(a velar g; no Engish equivalent)
h	similar to English *h*. (It occurs only in foreign loan words.)
i	as in *bit*
j	as *y* in *yellow* (similar to German *j*)
k	similar to English *k*
l	similar to English *l*
m	similar to English *m*
n	similar to English *n*
ŋ	as *ng* in *sing*
o	as in *force*
ɵ	(no English equivalent; similar to German *ö*)

[23] Rashid-ad-Din, *Sbornik Letopisei*. The chronicles of Rashid-ad-Din should not be confused with the much later *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*. The author of the latter work, Muhammad Haidar, named it in honor of Abdur Rashid Khan, ruler of Kashgar, 1533–65.

[24] Rachid-ed-Din, *Djami el-Tewarikh*.

[25] Bartold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, 37–48.

[26] Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches*, 1: 192–207.

[27] Yule, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*.

[28] *The Texts and Versions*.

BRIEF

The Kazakhs, one of the major Turkic peoples in the USSR, live in a strategic area in the heart of Soviet Central Asia. There are evidences of deep and continuing conflict between their way of life and the policies imposed upon them by the Soviet Communists. This study was intended to describe those sources of conflict and to indicate their implications for psychological warfare. A secondary objective of the study was to determine how well the vulnerabilities of a people inaccessible to direct methods of research can be assessed.

The traditional Kazakh way of life is pastoral nomadism; they abhor the settled farming life. Their customs and values reflect this independent heritage, and the Soviet drive during the 1930's to collectivize the nomads met with resistance. Between 1926 and 1939, the Kazakhs suffered a net population loss of almost one million--nearly one-fourth of their number in 1926. This loss was the result of starvation and disease, mass arrests and liquidations, flight across the border, and migration to neighboring Turkic peoples and to the urban and industrial areas of Siberia, all factors indirectly attributable to the impositions of Soviet control.

The organization of Kazakh society according to kin groups has been an important factor in contact with the Soviets. It has eased Kazakh transition to collective life, since most collective farms comprise single groups of blood relatives, but at the same time the closeness of the family ties has frequently led to the charge of nepotism by the Soviets.

The nativistic revival of Kazakh interest in their traditional heroes and customs was encouraged by the Soviets as a wartime morale measure. This revival--at once political, religious, and cultural in nature--became so strong that the Soviets considered it a threat and have attempted to suppress it. The importance of blood ties to the Kazakhs heightened their resentment of Soviet condemnation of their national heroes, whom they regard also as their ancestors. The Kazakhs' veneration of their past history and culture is fostered by their native religion, a blend of ancestor worship and shamanism. This folk religion is not formally organized. Administratively, the Soviets treat the Kazakhs as Moslems, although it is difficult to say how much Islam has influenced the rural Kazakhs.

The Kazakhs appear to be making only a minimal contribution to important republic activities which the Soviets are trying to encourage--industry and transport, Party and government. One explanation may be that the Kazakhs are not given equal opportunities; there is some evidence that the Slavs regard them as inferiors. Another reason is that the Kazakhs are not coming forward for training and advancement. Apparently they prefer to keep apart from the Slavic population of the republic; this conclusion is supported by the low rate of intermarriage between the two peoples. The Kazakhs appear to be opposed to many aspects of Sovietization, but at present their resistance is largely passive.

The local press proved to be a most useful source of information in the present study. The reports of local reactions and activities in relation to the official Party line provided many indications of strengths and weaknesses, trouble spots and failures. In addition to this source, research methods from many disciplines were combined to utilize all available data and information.

warfare exploitation of Kazakh vulnerabilities must depend upon an evaluation of conditions current at the time. However, it seems fairly certain that these vulnerabilities will center primarily about resistance to collectivization, Kazakh loyalties to their own nationality and culture, the strength of Kazakh ties to their kinsmen, and the persistence of their folk religion.

RESEARCH METHOD

The Kazakhs were selected as the subjects for this study because the great loss in Kazakh population in the 1930's suggested serious difficulties between them and the Soviets, and also because Kazakhstan is one of the more inaccessible and little known areas of the Soviet Union. Consequently, particular attention has been given to the analysis of demographic data in an attempt to define more exactly the extent and the causes of the population loss. At the same time, every effort has been made to develop techniques for exploiting all possible sources of information in order to provide a methodology applicable to the study of other inaccessible areas.

The report relies heavily on the use of local Kazakhstan newspapers, in addition to normally available sources of information. The local materials of the region have been systematically searched, and the analysis of their contents has permitted the composition of a picture of Kazakh life which could be constructed by no other means. Use of local sources of information was first regarded as only one of several research techniques; in the course of the project it developed into a systematic and productive methodology to depict the fabric of life of a region to which we have no direct access—a methodology not limited in its usefulness to the study of Kazakhstan. These day-to-day problems of life under the Soviets are not revealed in the more general sources of information emanating from the USSR, such as the Moscow press and radio. The local press, on the contrary, supplies detailed data on the relations between the ethnic minorities and the central regime in Moscow; it provides a gauge of the strengths and weaknesses of the economy, and points to trouble spots in the political structure, in education, and in cultural affairs.

KN 162 the USSR as a whole. Yet the total population of Kazakhstan remained virtually static, increasing by only 72,000 from 1926 to 1939 within the 1939 boundaries, an increase of 1.2 per cent. The rural population, however, decreased by more than a million, from 5,550,000 to 4,440,000. This comparison of rural and urban population figures summarizes the chief economic trends of the period: the loss of farmers and herdsmen through starvation, liquidation, and migration and the growth of the cities through the influx of industrial workers.

DEVELOPMENTS IN KAZAKHSTAN TO 1954

KN 161 K [121] It is difficult to make accurate estimates of Soviet population since the 1939 census, but methods have been devised for making estimates. Through figures for school registrations and for numbers of voters and voting districts, one can derive some idea of postwar Kazakh population trends (Table 2).

Table 2

ESTIMATED RECENT TRENDS IN THE POPULATION OF KAZAKHSTAN[a]

Year	Population Estimate	Per Cent Increase Over Previous Estimate
1948 (January)	6,560,000	6.7[b]
1950 (December)	6,800,000	3.8
1954 (March)	7,200,000	5.9

[a]Estimated through voting district analysis.
[b]Per cent increase over the 1939 figure of 6,150,000.

The 1939-1948 period showed an over-all population increase in Kazakhstan of 6.7 per cent. Since this period included the war years, losses due to the war were apparently compensated for by natural increase and migration into the republic. Possibly by 1948 some of those who had moved into Kazakhstan during the war had returned to their former homes. One example of this was the film industry, which established itself almost completely in Alma-Ata during the war, but which had returned to Moscow and Leningrad by 1948.

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The total estimated increase in population from 1939 to 1954 amounted to approximately one million. Forty per cent of this increase occurred in the nine-year period from 1939 to 1948, and 60 per cent of it in the remaining six years. The higher rate of increase during the more recent years is plausible, because of the elimination of the losses due to the war and to the movement out of the republic in the years 1946-1947. There is evidence of continued migration into Kazakhstan to the present day, in addition to natural increase, but it would be difficult to assign relative weights to these two factors.

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If the preceding estimates of the total population of Kazakhstan are correct, and if the percentage of Kazakhs in the population remained at the estimate for 1939 (43%), then the number of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan

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8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Appendix A

PROBLEMS AND METHODS OF RESEARCH[1]

The Bureau of Social Science Research, in agreeing to compose a background report on the Kazakhs for the Human Resources Research Office, regarded the report as a pilot study. The participants in the project had no guidelines other than broadly conceived research techniques such as are generally used in Soviet studies. The application of the results to the purposes of psychological warfare was in fact worked out in the course of the study. The Kazakhs presented additional difficulties because less is known in the United States about them than about, say, the Ukrainians, the Great-Russians, or other nationalities of the European parts of the Soviet Union. An interdisciplinary team was put together to meet these problems.

The primary function of the study was to provide a rounded picture of the Kazakhs and of the changes they were undergoing under the Soviets. Since these people live in an area ordinarily inaccessible, problems in information gathering had to be solved, as well as the more usual problems concerning interpretation and evaluation of data. The source materials to be drawn upon were scattered and had never previously been surveyed. The problem of sources will be described in the last part of this methodological survey, for it is a matter closely connected to the nature of the report and bears upon its value.

It is generally agreed that Soviet information may be used to compose a picture of life in the Soviet Union. Where Soviet information is not propaganda it is as reliable as similar information anywhere else, and where it is propaganda it is readily identifiable as such. The quantitative information is not as complete as it might be, but there is enough of it to permit evaluation and cross-checking.

The present statement on methods concerns itself with two problems: one, the contributions of various disciplines and their integration into a meaningful picture of Kazakh life; and the other, the sources of information, their scope and content.

DEMOGRAPHY

Attention had been drawn to the Kazakhs because of a striking demographic fact about them: They had suffered a severe population loss between 1926 and 1939. The techniques of demographic analysis would have been applied to them in any case but only as a secondary line of inquiry. In the Kazakh research, however, demography came to have a central place. This study had as its target the demarcation of vulnerabilities to psychological warfare, and common sense alone would suggest that a large population loss might well leave lasting vulnerabilities.

[1]By Lawrence Krader, Bureau of Social Science Research.

128 The official Soviet explanation of the Kazakh population loss serves
161 to call attention to the problems of demographic method as applied in this case. The only known reference by the Soviets to the matter of Kazakh losses is related to the development of industry in Soviet Asia. The loss of Kazakhs is laid to the growth of industry in areas neighboring on Kazakhstan, primarily the growth of industrial towns and cities in the southern Urals (Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk) and in southern Siberia (Novosibirsk, the Kuzbass, etc.). This statement implies a movement of Kazakhs from their native steppes to the cities to join in industry, thereby giving up their Kazakhdom. By shifting from the steppes to the factories and mines they became Russified and were, so the implication runs, listed as Russians in the 1939 census.

This simple explanation of a seemingly complex matter immediately arouses suspicion. The official Soviet explanation addresses itself only to the growth of industry, which is a positive merit in the Soviet scheme. Hence, one wonders whether a negative fact, a possible source of embarrassment to the Soviet propagandist, is being counterbalanced by a positive fact, the growth of industry.

Investigation of the population loss revealed a complex problem which no single explanation could resolve. The Kazakhs numbered 3,968,289 in the census of December 1926, and 3,098,764 in the census of January 1939. The loss in the 13-year period was thus almost 900,000, or 22 per cent. This figure, moreover, refers only to the physical or absolute loss, and the problem is broader than that. The Kazakhs would have been reproducing themselves during that period. For an understanding of the dynamics of possible population growth, an insight may be gained from comparison with a neighboring people. The Kirgiz are Turks just as the Kazakhs are. The traditional occupation of both is the raising of herds; both are natives of Central Asia, and have been for many centuries. The Kirgiz, living under different conditions in the Soviet period, increased by some 16 per cent during the 1926-1939 period while the Kazakhs were decreasing. The Kirgiz rate of increase was about the average for the entire Soviet Union. With a similar population increase, there would have been 4,600,000 Kazakhs by 1939, instead of 3,100,000. Thus one is faced with a projected loss of about 1,500,000. It is this projected population figure which we must deal with, rather than the actual. Of this, no mention is made in the Soviet literature.

129 A fuller understanding of the Kazakh population loss was gained by an intensive examination of Kazakh history, especially in the 19th century. In the light of their past record, the reactions of the Kazakhs to the process of Sovietization became comprehensible. In this process the Kazakhs, traditionally herdsmen, were forced into collective farms and were required to perform tasks contrary to their traditions and beliefs. The population loss was traced to resistance to collectivization, with attendant mass arrests, flight across the borders, mass starvation, and death; to poor organization of collectives; and finally, to industrialization and Russification.

ANTHROPOLOGY: THE PROBLEM OF ACCULTURATION

121 The interpretation of what Sovietization means involves a broader
177 methodological problem than the Kazakh question alone. One of the writers of the report had advanced the theory that in Sovietizing a people, the leaders of the USSR were performing what may be referred to as controlled acculturation. Acculturation in anthropology refers to

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the changes in one group of people which result from their coming into contact with another. This has been covered generally in the anthropological literature. However, contact between peoples, or the establishment of some kind of relationship by government, trade, or religious conversion, usually has been a matter of progressive development, not one of systematic planning based on a detailed preconceived notion of the new form the changing society will assume. The new idea in the Soviet scheme was that of the uniform transformation of all minority peoples in the Soviet Union to the new way of life. The use of force in this context has two purposes; it is used to maintain control; at the same time it is used to bring about change and control the direction of change.

The acculturation process may be described in terms of accommodation and conflict. What institutions do the people undergoing change possess to meet the change readily and accept it? On the other hand, what institutions do they have to oppose the change, to block off the culture contact? A balance sheet of the potential sources of accommodation and of conflict can be drawn up.

An example of this procedure may be taken from the process of forced collectivization of the Kazakhs. Herdsmen by tradition, the Kazakhs regard farming as a task for women and for those too poor to maintain themselves by herding. When the Soviets forced them to settle down on farms in the early 1930's, the Kazakhs resisted strongly. Their reactions might be compared to those of an American told to do something which questioned at once his manhood and his ability to support his family. But the response of the Kazakhs would be even stronger, because traditionally they have maintained a sharp separation between tasks which men perform, such as care of the herds, and tasks which women perform, such as farming. Further intensifying the response was the contempt of the Kazakh herdsman for the farmer.

The Soviet plan to settle the Kazakhs down on farms was motivated partly by economic considerations—to get the Kazakhs to raise farm produce in addition to herd produce. There was also a political factor; it is easier to control a population that is fixed in a definite place, as farmers are, than a group of nomads who might be anywhere within an area of a thousand square miles with their herds. But traditional Kazakh patterns of culture opposed and blocked Sovietization, partly due to the feelings of the people, partly due to their institutions.

On the other hand, certain aspects of the Kazakh way of life helped along the process of Sovietization. When the collective farms were set up, groups of Kazakhs who were blood kin were moved into them. The Kazakhs have traditionally lived and worked together in groups composed of such blood kin. Today, the typical collective farm is composed of closely related families, all descended from a common ancestor, who have been living in close contact with each other for hundreds of years. The Soviets, far from breaking up these groups, simply moved them bodily into the new farms. Thus there existed certain institutions which accommodated to and were readily adopted by the Soviet order.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

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Anyone engaged in Soviet studies faces the constant problem of the changing historical record: History is at times rewritten by Soviet writers. The comparison of the new version with the old presents two aspects. The first concerns the facts themselves: How have they been changed, that is, what facts have been suppressed and what new facts have now been made available? The second is a matter of the

137 interpretation: What does the change in the historical record mean with regard to Soviet attitudes?

The general methodological problem is one of historiography—the recording of the changes in the historical record by the Soviets. The historiographic approach is a fruitful one for the development of background data for psychological warfare. The comparison of what has been said in the past with what is said at present is an obvious line of inquiry. But more than that—by this confrontation, the outside observer comes to understand something of the mind of the Soviet leader. The change in the writing of history means that something is being suppressed or played down and something else is being given greater prominence.

A good example of this is to be seen in the change in historical writings regarding the old Kazakh leaders, especially those in the 19th century. Until after World War II, these old-time leaders were regarded as forces working in a good cause; they were positive historical forces. The background for this attitude, one officially adopted by the Soviet leadership, is of great interest. During the 19th century, the Tsarist empire had established itself in Central Asia and had colonized the area so that, with minor changes, the then existing boundaries are the same as those which exist today. But Tsarism and colonialism were both regarded as absolute evils by the leaders of the Russian Revolution. Therefore, so the argument of Soviet historians ran until recently, those who opposed them, the native leaders, were good.

The Kazakhs had produced leaders who fought long and bitter wars against the Russians and were sent down to bloody defeat a hundred years ago. The names of these leaders, Kenesary Kasymov, Isatai Taimanov, Nurmuhammed, and others, have great significance and honor to the Kazakhs. Part of their initial accommodation to the Soviet scheme lay in the fact that they were permitted to venerate their leaders as before the Revolution.

During World War II, when Moscow wanted to play on every stop which would call forth pro-Soviet feeling on the part of the local nationalities, the rulers in Moscow particularly encouraged the writing of accounts of the old leaders. However, the wave of writings which resulted from this encouragement went far beyond the expectations of the Soviet leaders. It appeared that a veritable cult of the old Kazakh heroes had long lain dormant, presumably for fear of reprisals from Moscow, and the merest hint of lifting the ban called forth the deepest veneration of their heroes by the Kazakhs.

The Moscow leaders soon realized the potentialities for disaffection in this and similar movements. It may be added that an exactly parallel development has taken place in the Caucasus and among neighboring peoples of southern Siberia, as well as throughout Central Asia. In the early 1950's, the interpretation of the absolute evil inherent in Tsarism and its colonialist policies was retracted. There was substituted for this interpretation the doctrine of a lesser evil. The argument now ran that Tsarism was a force for the good because the local leaders were even more reactionary than the Tsars of Russia were. Kenesary and the other Kazakh leaders were now branded as antiprogressive feudalists who in their wars (now termed illegal rebellions) against Tsarism were serving reactionary forces. It is even suggested that they were in the pay of foreign countries, primarily England.

The change in the Soviet line was not readily accepted by the Kazakhs. On the contrary, many Kazakh intellectuals had to be purged before the current line was accepted. And the political leaders of Central Asia, just as in other parts of Asia (notably India), are the intellectuals. Thus, from a problem in the writing and rewriting of history in the

Soviet Union, that is, from a problem of historiography, important themes of psychological warfare have emerged. 127

The problem of the old native leaders has another important aspect. The leaders of the Kazakh wars of a century ago were more than princes and generals. The Kazakhs are a people who are bound together by ties of blood as well as by common political traditions. Like other peoples of this part of the world—notably the Uzbeks, the Kirgiz, and the Mongols—they all trace descent from a single ancestor. From this ancestor, by painstaking genealogies over dozens of generations, the family trees are drawn, and every Kazakh knows his place on them. Thus, another anthropological approach, the method of kinship analysis, further illuminates the results of historiography.

Scorn of the old leaders is to the Kazakhs more than scorn of the national heroes. Contempt shown for George Washington to an American or for Richard the Lionhearted to an Englishman may cut deeply. But the Kazakh leaders of old are at the same time the ancestors or blood kinsmen of the present-day Kazakhs. Thus an attack on those leaders is a double insult.

AN EXAMPLE OF THE INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH: THE ANALYSIS OF NATIVISM AND NATIONALITY

Reaction to conquest among subject peoples frequently takes the form of nativism. By nativism is meant a cult venerating the way of life which existed before or at the time of the conquest. The present conditions are rejected, the old way of life—however unpleasant it may have been—is glorified. The concept of nativism has been worked out in recent anthropological thinking in many parts of the world. Most recently it has been applied to Asiatic Russia, to the peoples of Siberia and Central Asia. The Kazakhs, too, have had their cult of the past, the glorification of their older way of life as a means of protest against conditions of the present. Thus investigation of nativism is intimately bound up with the historiographic problem, side by side with kinship analysis. The blood-ties with the past are of a piece with current problems of collective farm composition, which are likewise based on blood relationships. The kin-group was noted as a means of accommodation to Sovietization, but at the same time it is a great reservoir of anti-Soviet sentiment and potential disaffection. 128

The reaction to conquest is always a two-way stream. The problem of gauging the form and intensity of the Russian reaction, that of the conqueror, as well as that of the Kazakhs, had to be explored. The imposition of Soviet planning on the Kazakhs is part of a more general problem, applicable everywhere in the Soviet Union. In the course of the investigation the methods of labor-force analysis were brought to bear on the question of current relations between Russians and Kazakhs. The various occupations, such as farm laborer, transport worker, industrial technician, bookkeeper and accountant, manager and farm director, were rated as to degree of specialization of training required. These were then broken down into nationality composition within Kazakhstan. It was found that the Kazakhs were proportionately most heavily represented in occupations requiring little specialized training, and most poorly represented farther up the scale. This is especially true of Kazakh women.

The findings in the analysis of occupations by nationality were corroborated by the analysis of membership in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan; it was found that Moscow was especially concerned with [127]

[28 [27] the low proportion of local nationals in the Party and had repeatedly notified the local Party leadership to that effect. Again this was especially true in the women's cadres. This pattern was borne out in examination of marriage rates by nationality: The rate of Kazakh intermarriage with Russians was found to be virtually zero. Linguistics contributed also to this aspect of the investigation.

Methodologically, the inquiry into nationality proved to be most interesting inasmuch as three separate problem areas were involved, each with its own technique. Analyses of the labor force, of Party membership, and of the intermarriage rate all led to the same general conclusion that the degree of contact between the Russian and Kazakh peoples was low, and in certain places nonexistent. Again, the reluctance of either group to associate with the other was postulated; neither was more willing to do so than the other. Analysis of the urban pattern, while it did not present findings so clear-cut as those above, tended to support them. That is, there is some evidence that the different nationals live in distinct and separate sections of the various cities. All this points to a situation of poor intergroup and race relations.

DISCUSSION OF METHODS USED

To sum up the problems and methods thus far: The attention of the investigating team was focused on the Kazakhs because of a known demographic problem, a people who underwent a loss in population while the Soviet Union as a whole was gaining. The official Soviet explanation was regarded as unsatisfactory. What methods would best afford a fuller understanding of the problem, and at the same time supply background material for a general picture of the life of the Kazakhs and their accommodations and blocks to Sovietization? A number of approaches and disciplines were brought to bear on the subject: demography, economics, anthropology, sociology, and social psychology.

An interplay between all these disciplines was drawn upon. Problems posed in one discipline, such as demography, found an answer in sociology or anthropology, for instance, in the question of the population loss. A problem in sociology or anthropology concerning the nature of intergroup relations could be solved by applying the methods of labor-force analysis, and by drawing upon the findings of political science and economics. Historiography called attention to a problem in attitudes toward older heroes which could be subjected most readily to anthropological analysis. For drawing the general picture of Kazakh life, all disciplines had to be called upon.

There are inherent limitations in the methods of each of the separate disciplines. The demographic analysis could not afford insight into social tensions, although it could call attention to an area where social tensions might be found. Moreover, the data of demography supplied the basis for important measurements of relations between Slavs and Kazakhs. Possibly the most important of these measurements or indices was the marriage rate between the two peoples. A question was posed, one frequently asked by anthropologists and sociologists, regarding the composition of the family: Were there many mixed marriages? The demographic analysis made possible an answer to this question. The interpretation of the findings revealed a potential in the field of group relations for the formation of psychological warfare themes. Similarly, the historiographic method had certain limitations. Behind the question of the rewriting of history lay the changes in Soviet line, a political matter, and the changes in the Kazakh social

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order, an anthropological one. It is clear that each of the disciplines employed was needed to help the other; the limitations of each method demanded this kind of cooperation.

From one point of view, all these methods exemplify the functional approach in anthropology, which starts from the idea that every people, nation, or society is formed of parts which combine into a closely interrelated whole. The parts are determined by asking questions about political behavior, economic activity, marriage relations, and so forth, in order to establish the form of the political, economic, or family institutions. A change or a trouble spot in one of these has repercussions in all the others, just as a man who is deeply concerned with matters in his office might bring them home with him and disturb the family peace by scolding his child with unaccustomed loudness.

Sovietization has changed the political, economic, legal, and religious insitutions of the Kazakhs. These changes are presumably in accordance with a master plan of the leadership in Moscow. Of course this plan has not worked out completely, since man and his institutions are far too complicated to be mastered thoroughly, or for social behavior to be predicted except in the grossest terms. The Soviet leaders believe they have objective control because they alone have mastered the laws of history, and know in advance the direction in which societies necessarily must move. However, common sense tells us that man's culture is not so easily decreed, that the science of culture is far from perfect. Soviet leaders must fill the gap between their aims and their achievements, between collectivization in theory and in actuality, for example, by the systematic application of force to bring the resisting peasants into line. Functional analysis can show how a breakdown in one part of the whole, say a failure in the plan for collectivization, has repercussions in the rate of marriage or in Party membership. For this kind of inquiry Soviet theory is not well equipped, just as it is not equipped to answer the question of why a Kazakh herder will not take to farming.

THE LOCAL PRESS AND OTHER SOURCES

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Closely related to the considerations of methods employed in the Kazakh report is the matter of sources used. Local sources, which meant first and foremost the newspapers, were systematically explored. The local press of Kazakhstan, just as for all other parts of Central Asia and for many parts of the Soviet Union, is available in this country, with very few gaps in the various series. These newspaper files exist most fully in the Library of Congress, thus making all other cities in the country secondary to Washington as a center for this kind of investigation.

The local press, just as everywhere in the Soviet Union, has two levels of writing. On the top level, in the reports which first strike the eye, there are the articles expounding Party doctrine. These may be quickly scanned and set aside; their information content is low, and is of interest only to those who follow the evolutions of the Party line. Since this is uniform for the entire Soviet Union, little in it is relevant to the local scene.

The level below the doctrinary one has proved to be a rich source of information, for the entire life of the Kazakh republic is spread out before the investigator. With utmost frankness, the shortcomings in various fields of activity are discussed, whether in politics, economics, or elsewhere. The local press records the entire system of rewards and punishments, praise and blame, what is being built and what has failed of expectation.

127 A case in point is the matter of the honors list. Periodically, lists of people singled out for various kinds of honors are published in full. These lists permit insight into the nationalities of the various groups of people in the different republics and regions. The representativeness of the sample may be determined independently in certain instances. For instance, it may be determined from the honors list that Kazakhs, especially Kazakh women, are underrepresented in the upper Party echelons; a decree from Moscow deploring the very situation may be found. Similarly, lines of inquiry have been opened up by the lists of mothers honored for bearing many children, workers and managers in industry for overfulfilling their norms, and so forth.

Whether the samples are representative may not always be checked, but they have been verified as reliable in a sufficient number of cases to permit placing confidence in the whole procedure. At the same time insight is gained into the approved pattern for Soviet life as advocated by the leadership and, parallel to this, into the areas of disapproval where the pattern is in danger of breaking down.

The exploration of the local press was first thought of as a technique in the gathering of information, along with other possible sources. However, this approach quickly proved its superiority over all others. A number of lines of inquiry were opened up which had not at first been contemplated. Among these was the establishment of a number of indices or measures of basic attitudes and tensions. For instance, if it can be shown numerically that there is no, or very little, intermarriage between Kazakhs and Russians, this alone is one of the most significant indicators of underlying attitudes between the two peoples now living side by side in Kazakhstan. Data on this point were derived from a compilation of social notices in the local papers.

The examination of the local press thus developed from a simple technique to a method of systematically gathering information. Out of this emerged a number of problems to be met and solved regarding the Kazakhs which could not otherwise have been approached. The local press made greater depth possible, a broader range of study, and above all, systematic coverage. It may be added that the methods developed in the Kazakh study were further applied in a subsequent study of the Kirgiz republic, and are now in the process of being applied to the whole of Central Asia.

In addition to historical materials, demographic and other data issued by the Soviet government, and the local newspapers, this research has drawn upon all available studies of the Kazakhs, both Soviet and foreign. The non-Russian sources are listed in the bibliography of this report; the Slavic references are available on application to the Human Resources Research Office. Although the discussion in this appendix has been concerned primarily with what the researchers have learned from the use of new approaches and from the special problems encountered in studying the Kazakhs, neither this nor any other study of peoples within the USSR can afford to overlook any source of information.

By way of conclusion it should be added that use of local sources of information is not a universal solution for all problems of obtaining data regarding the Soviet Union. There are many matters, above all in the technical and military fields, on which they give no information. They do, however, permit insight into areas where there is otherwise none. A major result of the Kazakh research lies in the development of means for the study of the Soviet Union from a distance through its local press.

61 of the estates, the clan and lineage formation is a ver-
565 tical cleavage. A sŭök might be identical with a byr top in any given instance, but the principle upon which it was based was different. The horizontal cleavage was derived from the superposition of one layer of society upon another, and was a means of building the social hierarchy. The vertical cleavage could fit the system of a social hierarchy or a polysegmentary system without a supra-clan hierarchy equally well; an example of the latter alternative, a polysegmentary clan-lineage formation without aristocratic and commoner estates is found in the Kara-Kirgis social structure.

Appendix: Kazakh of the Altai

101 Two expeditions to the Niaman division of the Kazakhs
● 127 of the Middle Horde were undertaken by a number of Turkic
177 specialists in the 1920's. The localities they concentrated on were in the extreme northeast corner of Kazakhstan, hence difficult of access, in rugged country and were presumably chosen by the ethnographers Bukeikhan, Baronov, Margulanov, and Rudenko, and the linguist Samoilovich because here the degree of acculturation (such was not their term) would be lowest of any part of the Kazakh world. The account of the Altai Kazakhs has been separated from the rest of the data on the Kazakhs and put into this appendix. A word is needed in answer to (1) why the following data are incorporated at all, and

101 (2) why they are separated from the text proper. As
●127 to why the Soviet era data are added, it may be said
177 at once that they are marginally Soviet: they were gathered in the 1920's, and from an outlying province where the impact of Soviet acculturation had barely begun; and again, fully recognizing the acculturated life of these people, certain factors have remained constant, "recognizable," from the past, and the data regarding them supplement descriptions of the previous era, fill in old gaps. The resultant picture has historical significance, it tells what happened later; it has comparative significance, it permits the confrontation of Kazakh data with other data, such as the Kalmuk. But the post-revolutionary report is separated from the pre-revolutionary data because of the great changes in the life of the component peoples of the Russian empire.

Clan and Lineage

167 The Kazakhs of the Naiman division are sometimes
101 called a tribe. Adequately detailed genealogical data
175 afford a considerable amount of insight into the struc-
619 ture of the Kazakh clan and lineage. We are faced with a distinction which has been encountered several times in the course of the present study: the distinction between "objective" history and history as mythopoeia. As to the first, Margulanov tells us that these Naiman, in branching off (ramifying, as Firth has put it) from